who focuses on investnue sources such as sales and income ment and Bradbury, Downs, and Small taxes, they still rely heavily on the local (1982) who focus on changes in employproperty tax to finance their local public ment.) These more aggregate variables are expenditures.
Despite this heavy reliharder to model precisely because they ance, surprisingly little is known about reflect a variety of economic decisions inthe impact of a city's property tax rate on cluding, for example, the decision to exits tax base.
pand, to shut down, to set up a new branch Many local public officials apparently plant, or to start a new firm. believe that property taxes have signifiEven if economists better understand cant adverse effects on city economic ac-the links between local taxes and the lotivity. Witness, for example, their frecation and expansion decisions of firms, quent willingness to grant tax abatements they would still be unable to answer the to encourage economic investment in the central question of this study, namely, city. Applied economists, in contrast, are what impact do local property taxes have nearly unanimous in their skepticism both on the size of a city's property tax base? about the wisdom of such tax breaks and,
The difficulty arises because the city tax more fundamentally, about the magn'lbase includes residential as well as busitude of the adverse behavioral effects of ness property and because the market state and local taxes. Many empirical value of such property reflects not only studies appear to support the contention the intensity of economic development (the that differentials in state and local tax quantity of capital) but also location rents, burdens are simply too small to offset difthat is, the prices that firms and houseferences in the more basic determinants holds are willing to pay to invest in the of firm location such as labor costs and central city rather than elsewhere. High accessibility to markets. (See surveys by property taxes may reduce the size of the *Duke University, Durham, NC 27706 tax base either by reducing the level of '*Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, MA business or residential economic activity 02106 in the city or by being capitalized into [Vol. XLI lower property values, or by some comlocal taxes can be modeled more easily bination of both. Whatever the mechathan could those of an aggregated set of nism, city officials and economists ought governmental units. Hence, our goal is to to care about the responsiveness of the measure the impact of city property taxes city's property tax base to the property tax on city property tax bases, controlling for rate. To the extent that the current tax all other taxes that may affect the amount rate reduces the size of the base, the adof taxable property in the city. ditional tax rate needed to finance a given
The basic data are for 86 U.S. central increase in public expenditures will be cities for three years-1972, 1977, and higher. 1982 . The 86 comprise all those American Other state and local taxes such as incities with population over 300,000 in 1970 come or sales taxes may also affect local or 1980 plus all the central cities of the property values despite their initial inci-50 largest SMSAs in either 1970 or 1980. dence on non-property factors of producThus, the analysis includes all major cention or on other economic transactions.
tral cities in the United States. The comHence, a secondary goal of this paper is bined 1980 population of the 86 cities to provide quantitative estimates of the constitutes 21 percent of the 1980 U.S. effects of other state and local taxes on population and 94 percent of the U.S. popthe size of a city's property tax base. This ulation in central cities containing 50,000 aspect of the study can be viewed as the or more people. first step in a larger and more ambitious Property taxes are less important for city study that would examine the effects of governments than for other types of local all major city taxes on each of a city's tax governments such as counties and school bases.
districts, but they still accounted for over half of the 1982 tax revenues of the average city in our sample. Dependence on I. The Data and the Role of the the property tax varies greatly across citProperty Tax ies and regions; cities with population under 100,000 receive more than twice as Our empirical work focuses on the relarge a share of revenues from the proplationship between city property taxes and erty tax as cities with population over 1 the market value of potentially taxable million and cities in the Northeast deproperty in U.S. central cities. City govpend on property tax revenues twice as emments, however, are often not alone in heavily as those in the West. having the power to levy property taxes Effective property tax rates, like depenon the property located within city dence on the property tax, also vary subboundaries.
In many metropolitan areas, stantially across cities. We define an efindependent school districts, county govfective tax rate as ernments, and special districts are also authorized to tax city property if it falls t T/B, within their jurisdictional boundaries. Moreover, the economic activity generwhere T is the city's total revenues from ated by the city's property may be subject the property tax, and B is the market value to state or local sales and income taxes.
of all potentially taxable property in the Regardless of whether they apply specifcity. The tax base in this measure is inically to property or are levied by overtended to be independent of how each city lying governments, all of these taxes (and defines its tax base in practice and to inthe corresponding public services they ficlude all property other than that uninance) could affect the size of a city's tax versally exempt from the property tax such base. Hence, all must be taken into acas churches and government buildings. count.
Data on property tax revenues are readily Our primary perspective, however, is the available from the Census of Governcity government itself. As an independent ments, but the market value of each city's decision-making entity, its decisions about potential tax base had to be estimated from
No. 41 CITY TAXES AND PROPERTY TAX REVENUES 505 data on assessed values and assessment/ alone. The inclusion of property taxes sales ratios, supplemented, where possilevied by overlying governments would ble, with data gathered directly from cit-raise the rates substantially in some cases.) ies.' Because of missing data, information
The table shows that tax rates are genon tax bases is available for only 68 of the erally highest for the smallest and the 86 cities for all three years, but a total of largest cities in the sample. This pattern 202 city-year observations are available reflects heavy dependence on the propfor the pooled regression analysis re-erty tax relative to other revenue sources ported below.
in the small cities and heavy overall tax- Table 1 shows the level and variation ation in the large cities. The table also in effective tax rates for the 68 cities with shows that among regions, rates in northcomplete information. The average rate eastern cities are strikingly higher than decreased from 0.9 percent in 1972 to 0.6 those elsewhere. percent in 1982. (These rates may appear This wide variation in effective tax rates low, but they are averages of city tax rates provides a natural experiment for exam- These effective property tax rates refer to property taxes of city governments alone; see text for definition of effective property tax rate and sources.
Economic activity in these cities may also be subject to property taxes imposed by independent school districts or county governments.
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[Vol. XLI ining the hypothesis that city tax rates sections that follow. Table 2 reports their affect the attractiveness of a city to mnemonic variable names, definitions, households and firms and thereby di-means, and standard deviations. rectly influence the size of the city's poProperty Tax Rate. A higher tax rate is tential property tax base. Correspondexpected to reduce the value of the city's ingly wide variation in city use of property tax base in part because the land alternative revenue sources and in tax component of the tax will be capitalized burdens imposed on city residents by into lower property values. In addition, the overlying jurisdictions also provide the improvements component of the tax is exinformation needed to determine the ef-pected to induce producers to shift away fects of other taxes on city property tax from capital toward labor and to reduce bases.
the attractiveness of the city as a place for investing capital. The reduced attrac-11. Conceptual Framework tiveness of the city may manifest itself either in a change in land prices or in reOur model has four structural compo-duced economic activity or, most likely, in nents: 1) a tax base equation, 2) a bal-some combination of both. anced budget equation, 3) a demand
Estimating the relationship between the equation for public spending, and 4) a tax market value of city property tax bases mix equation. The tax base equation cap-and city property tax rates would be reltu'res the effects of private sector deci-atively straightforward if tax rates could sions about locating and investing in the be viewed as exogenous. Such rates would central city. The demand and tax mix be exogenous, for example, if state laws equations describe the behavior of local mandated binding limits on each city's public decisionmakers and, with the bal-property tax rate and all cities were at anced budget requirement, determine the their specified legal limits so that city tax level of property tax revenues in each city. rates would not be affected by the size of Our primary focus is on the tax base the city tax bases. Perusal of the laws afequation. For reasons discussed in the next fecting city property taxes, however, sugsection, however, careful attention to the gests that in most cases a city's property other three components is needed to as-tax rate, expressed as a fraction of full sure appropriate estimation of the effect market value, is not independent of the of local property tax rates on city tax bases.
city's tax base. While many cities are subject to tax limitations of some form, only The Tax Base Equation rarely do these limitations determine the effective tax rate. The clearest exceptions The size of a city's property tax base re-are California cities in 1982 and Boston flects investment decisions made over time in 1982, each of which is subject to a by households and firms in response to the binding limit ex ressed in terms of an efperceived costs and benefits of a city lo-fective tax rate.p cation. In modelling the outcome of these More commonly, the local property tax decisions, we focus on the local property rate is determined in part by the size of tax rate, controlling for three sets of ex-the tax base. Consider, for example, the ogenous variables in addition to year following model of city behavior. City dummies, and the lagged dependent varigovernment officials choose a level of exable. The first set of exogenous variables penditures in response to the demand of are those that emerge from a simple citizen voters for public services. They then monocentric model of an urban economy.
levy sufficient property taxes to pay for Second are those that control for taxes whatever portion of total expenditures that other than municipal property taxes lev-they choose not to finance from other revied on economic activity generated in the enue sources. According to this model, a city. Third are measures of public ser-higher tax base would lead to a lower tax vices. The variables and reasons for in-rate for any given property tax levy. cluding them are explained in the subAssuming a log-linear specification of
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In PBASE -a + b In t + c In X + e, (1) + e/(l + b).
Thus, treating property tax revenue, the value of property per unit of land; more rather than the tax rate, as the explanland means that the city extends further atory variable removes one source of the down the rent and density gradients of the simultaneity problem, yet still makes it metropolitan area. possible to solve for b, the elasticity of the Expressing the dependent variable in base with respect to the tax rate.
per capita terms rather than per unit of Even per capita tax revenue, however, land is more natural for the current emmay not be exogenous. A larger base pirical investigation. Hence, the depenmeans that the same amount of revenue dent variable in equation 3 must be mulcan be raised with a lower tax rate' re-tiplied by the inverse of the population ducing the pain of raising taxes and density (that is, by LAND/POP, where thereby increasing the willingness of vot-POP is the population of the city). One ers to vote for higher taxes. (See later sec-approach at this point would be to add the tions of the paper for further discussion.) logarithm of density (with a predicted Thus we treat property tax revenue as an coefficient of -1) to the right-hand side endogenous variable in the property tax of equation 3. The difficulty here is that base equation.
population density is endogenous in that Variables Derived From an Urban it, too, is determined by the exogenous deModel. To capture the influence of the terminants of land prices in the city, private economy on a city's property tax namely SMPOP and LAND. Hence, inbase, we begin with a monocentric model cluding population density as an exogeof an urban economy. This strategy Of nous variable in the estimating equation building on the descriptive implications would not make sense. Instead, we specify of an urban model dramatically simplithe reduced form of the model in log-linfies what is in fact an enormously com-ear form as plicated and not-very-well-understood problem, the behavioral modeling of eco-In PBASE a + cl In SMPOP nomic activity in an urban area.' The following log-linear specification incorpo-+ C2 In LAND + e (4) rates the essential implications of the standard urban model for the total value where PBASE is the property tax base per of property (B) per unit of land (LAND) capita and the coefficients el and C2 repin the portion of the metropolitan area resent the combined effects of the exogedesignated as the central city:
nous variables on the base per unit of land and on population density. Provided the InB/LAND co'+c,'InSMPOP exogenous variables affect the population density gradient less strongly than the + C2' In LAND + e' (3) rent and business density gradients, we still predict a positive sign for SMPOP and where e' is a random error. Controlling a negative sign for LAND.' for the amount of land in the city, more
The sample cities, and the metropolitan activity in the metropolitan area as meaareas in which they are located, vary in sured by metropolitan population (SMPOP) how well they fit the simple monocentric leads to a higher value of property in the model. Of most concern is that some of the city per unit of city land. According to the central cities in the sample are not the monocentric model, this occurs both be-primary centers of economic activity in cause larger metropolitan areas have their respective SMSAS. Thus, for examhigher land prices at the center and also ple, Everett WA, with its 1982 population because the higher price of land induces of 57,000, has far less claim to being the more intensive economic development in center of the Seattle-Everett metropolithe city in the form of business and res-tan area than does Seattle with 490,000 idential structures.
residents. To help control for such variaMore city land, controlling for metrotions, an additional variable (KEYCC) politan population, is predicted to reduce takes on the value one for those cities that m -- any study of the effects of state or local ables. A higher income tax rate lowers the taxes. Since public services are valued and net-of-tax income of city residents, and taxes are used to pay for them, failure to may induce firms to pay higher wages control for services could lead to incorrect than they otherwise would, thereby reestimates of the effects of taxes alone. In ducing net profits and discouraging inprinciple, we need to control for all servestment in the city. These effects will revices available to city firms and houseduce the demand for property in the city holds regardless of whether the services except in the unlikely event that the inare provided by the city government itself centive for firms to substitute away from or by some overlying government such as labor in favor of land and capital is large a state or county government or an inenough to offset the output effect. A higher dependent school district. sales tax rate may reduce the demand for Public expenditures typically serve as taxed goods, and, similarly, lead to less the standard measure of public services investment in the city. in studies of tax capitalization (e.g. Oates, The tremendous complexity and varia-1969), but, as shown by Rosen and Fultion in the division of taxing responsibillerton (1977) , output measures such as ities among city and non-city governeducational test scores are far superior. ments across states makes it impossible Hence, we have constructed three public to control separately for each of the nonservice measures that are intended to city taxes imposed on city economic activmeasure public sector outputs rather than ity. Instead, we constructed a single varisimply public inputs. The first is the able (OVTAX), based on statewide data, number of crimes in the city expressed as
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CITY TAXES AND PROPERTY TAX REVENUES 511 a fraction of the city's total private sector where k is the proportional adjustment employment (CRIME). Vocal public conoccurring in one (five-year) period. Takcern about crime makes it plausible that ing natural logarithms yields: the decision to invest in a particular city might be influenced by the perceived risk
In PBASET \In PBASET* of being assaulted or robbed. Higher crime + (1 )L)In PBASE, (6) rates per worker in the city are p redicted to lead to lower property values. The secHence, the model now includes all the deond and third variables (FIRESER and terminants of PBASE* described above MISCER) are proxies for fire protection plus the lagged base, PBASE, 1. Recalland miscellaneous services (consisting of ing the formulation of equation (2) on local public exgreater the exporting, the lower the burpenditures is well developed and needs den on city residents), which is also exonly brief review here.' The typical startpected to influence the choice among reving point is that the quantity of public enue sources, described in the next services demanded is a function of resisubsection of the paper.11 dent income, per unit costs, and tax prices.
As specified so far, desired expendiDesired expenditure on the ith expenditures are not explicitly dependent on the ture category (E,) is the product of costs size of the property tax base. This priand quantity demanded. Hence, marily reflects the simplicity of the decisive voter model, particularly in its me-E, C,Q, f(Y, C,, TS), (9) dian voter form, rather than economic reality. In more realistic models, the tax where Y is the income of the decisive voter, base or its components might well influ-C, is per unit cost of the ith expenditure ence demand. crime. Hence, using the simple model a given level of output such as protection presented in equation 9 to justify excludfrom crime. The idea here is that enviing the size of the property tax base as an ronmental conditions in the city that are explanatory variable would be a mistake. outside of the control of city officials, such Moreover, as discussed below, the reveas city density and the incidence of povnue mix component of the model also im erty, may affect the costs to the city of plies that the property tax base is a deproviding a given level of the output, such terminant of property tax revenue. as police protection, ultimately valued by The analysis to this point argues for incity residents. To reflect such cost varicluding in the revenue equation standard ations, we have included three cost in-determinants of the demand for spending dices for miscellaneous public services on individual public services: resident in-(MCOST), police protection services come, a tax exporting measure, service-(PCOST), and fire protection services specific measures of costs, and the prop-(FCOST). The cost indices are derived from erty tax base. One additional variable rea regression model that estimates the avlated to expenditures dominates all the erage impact on city expenditures of each others in terms of its relevance to this cost factor, controlling for other determistudy, namely a measure of the services nants of city spending such as resident for which each city government in the income and preferences." sample is responsible. Given the cross Given the purpose of this study, we need sectional nature of the data set, variation not be precise about the identity of the in service responsibilities is likely to be a decisive voter. The larger is the property tax base per net of user charges that would be re-person, the easier it should be for the city quired in each city to achieve national av-to raise revenue through the property tax. erage per capita state-local spending on A larger tax base allows the city to raise each of 17 designated services, given the a given amount of revenue with a lower particular allocation of spending respontax rate and thereby to avoid the potensibilities in each city's state. Constructed tially distorting effects and heavy tax from statewide rather than city-specific burdens of high tax rates. expenditure data, the measure avoids the In most cases, authorization of alterpotential problem of attributing high ser-native revenue options is a state, rather vice responsibilities to cities which choose than a city, decision. Yet, authorization to to provide high service levels. The meause nonproperty taxes plays a key role in sure varies substantially across cities. The the city tax decision given the stringent most obvious variation relates to services restrictions often placed on city revenuesuch as elementary and secondary eduraising authority. As already noted, only cation and municipal hospitals for which 18 of the 86 sample cities are currently a city has either complete spending re-allowed to use some form of local income sponsibility or none. Some cities are also or payroll tax, and 47 cities a general sales responsible for services provided by countax. A higher proportion of cities are perties in other states. Variation across states mitted to impose some form of selective in the role of state government also ac-sales tax. Availability of alternative tax counts for a substantial portion of the sources is likely to decrease a city's relivariation in service responsibilities across ance on the local property tax, Availabilstates; the greater the state role in welity is indicated with dummy variables: fare, health, and corrections, the lower, in AVINC refers to local income, earnings, 12 general, is the city role.
or payroll taxes; AVGSAL refers to the Choice among Revenue Sources. Sub-general sales tax; AVSSAL refers to setracting nontax exogenous revenues (OR lective sales taxes. in equation 8) from total desired expenNot all taxing instruments impose equal ditures yields the amount of revenue that burdens on resident voters. A portion of must be raised from local tax sources. the burden of a local sales tax, for exNontax revenue is primarily intergovernample, might be shifted onto nonresident mental aid, but in principle, only the aid tourists and commuters in the form of that is truly exogenous. As measured, higher prices. Or a payroll tax may fall however, some of the per capita federal partially on nonresident commuters. Simaid (FAID) and per capita state aid ilarly, part of the property tax burden may (STAID) may be matching aid.
ultimately be bome by nonresidents in the How the remaining revenue requireform of lower profits, higher prices, or ments are allocated among local tax lower wages. The export ratios (ER), desources has received much less attention fined as the proportion of the tax burden from economists than has the expendiassociated with each of the major local ture decision.
13 Consistent with the deci-taxes that can be shifted to nonresidents, sive voter approach, one might hypothare included in the equation to account for esize the following model of the city this burden shifting. The hypothesis is that decision regarding how much to rely on local voters choose taxes in such a way as local property taxes:
to n-dnimize burdens on themselves. Hence, a higher export ratio for the property tax PTAX/TTAX = F(PBASE, AV, ER) (10) (ERPROP) is expected to lead to greater reliance on property taxes, but higher exwhere PBASE, as before is the per capita port ratios for sales (ERSAL) or income property tax base, AV is a vector of dummy taxes (ERINC) are expected to reduce city [Vol. XLI reliance on property taxes. coefficient of the endogenous revenue The calculation of each export ratio re-variable in the base equation. One must lies first on assumptions about which be careful, however, to assure that each groups -consumers, workers, or owners of the proposed instruments is truly exof property-bear the burden of each tax ogenous in the two-fold sense that 1) it does and second on estimates of the proportion not belong in the equation as an explanof each group that lives outside the city.
atary variable and 2) conditional on 1) it The incidence assumptions are straightis uncorrelated with the error term. forward for the income and sales taxes;
Following Lugar and Stahl's (1986) exlocal income taxes are assumed to be borne position of Hausman (1978), we perform fully by workers in the form of lower wages a set of simple t-tests to determine whether and local sales taxes by consumers in the each of the variables excluded from the form of higher prices. The incidence as-base equation is truly exogenous in the sumptions used for the property tax are sense just stated. For example, consider a much more complex and are spelled out variable such as the index of service reelsewhere.'5 Calculated export ratios for sponsibilities.
Based on our conceptual all three taxes vary substantially across framework, this variable belongs in the cities because of differences in how cities revenue equation but not in the tax base define their tax bases, the diversity of city equation. The division of service responroles in metropolitan areas, and variasibilities among levels of government tions in the mix of shoppers, job-holders, should have no effect on city property valor property types across cities.
ues, controlling for public service levels, In summary, the property tax revenue aside from its effect through property tax equation incorporates the determinants of liabilities. By adding it to the base equatotal revenue requirements, including tion and testing the hypothesis that its resident income, service-specific cost in-coefficient is zero, we are testing the joint dices, the property tax base, and a meanull hypothesis required for exogeneity. sure of city government service responThrough a process of trial and error, we sibilities, as well as the determinants of obtain a set of instrumental variables revenue mix, such as exogenous intergovwhose members all pass the exogeneity ernmental aid and the availability and test. exportability of nonproperty tax sources:
These exogenity tests lead us to reject as instruments two of the excluded vari-PTAX F(PCY, MCOST, PCOST, ables: the export ratio for property tax burdens (ERPROP) and the cost index for FCOST, PBASE, TSRI, FAID, STAID, police services (PCOST). Failure to pass AVINC, AVGSAL, AVSSAL, ERINC, the exogeneity test, however, need not m an that the variables belong in the base e ERSAL,ERPROP,YR82,YR77).
(11) equation as explanatory variables; conditional on a true model that excludes As in the base equation, the variables are them, the variables may simply be corexpressed in logarithmic form for estirelated with the error term. This latter mation.'6 interpretation applies to both variables. Variation in neither variable can be said to cause variation in the tax base. In-III. Estimation and Results stead, the causation probably goes in the Careful specification of the revenue other direction; cities with larger per capequation provides a rich set of potential ita tax bases simply tend to have greater instruments for our 2SLS estimation of potential to export property tax burdens the tax base equation. In particular, the and higher costs of providing police ser-12 variables that appear as control vari vices than those with smaller tax bases." ables in the tax revenue, but not in the An additional econometric problem could base equation, are logical candidates for arise from the presence in the base equainstruments than can serve to identify the tion of the lagged dependent variable. As
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is well known, the coefficient of the lagged ita property vaillo8 o,,Id be 16 Percent variable will be inconsistently estimated lower in the hi,"Iier tax citylong-run if the equation error in time t is corre-A more direct estimate of the ,Uation withlated with the error in time t -1. For-response emerges@from the eq le. The @pendent variab tunately, however, inconsistency is not a out the lagged de ne perproblem here; using a Hausman test of the coefficient of -.. 1,4 implies that a 0 ,y tax rate form elaborated by Lugar and StaM (1986) , cent difference in a city's PrOPe". the size ,ent difference in we reject the null hypothesis that the leads to a. 12 pere Ong-run equilibrium aslagged base is correlated with the error of its base. The makes term.18 @;umption iinplicit it., this equation less ap- Table 3 presents the coefficients esti-this somewhat-srrialler estimate the parmated using two-stage least squares with pealing than the estimate from data for 1972, 1977, and 1982 of whom seerl to.al taxes on the grounds focuses primarily on the partial adjust-other state and loc tax burden to cOnment model, which we prefer because it that they can shift the prices. To allows for the dynamics of property mar. sumers in the fol,nl of higher. ket adjustments over time.
economists, however, the finding is still rising; by discouraging Overall, the equations perform well. The somewhat surp higher consumption of taxed items, the coefficient of primary interest, that of the . I level of property tax variable, is -0.080 and sig-prices should reduce the city' nificantly different from zero. Ignoring for economic activity.
by our esa moment the lagged adjustment term and Once it has been TnultiPlied the coefficient of the recalling from equation 2 that this esti-timate of ((I + b)/\), LOVTAX) mated coefficient equals (b/(l + b)), we overlying tax burden variable ( ed directly as a long-run estimate the short-run elasticity of a city's can be interpret fficient of per capita property tax base with respect elasticity. In contrast, the coe to its property tax rate to be approxithe income tax rate variable (TRINC), not in logqrithrn form, niust be mately -0.075, where the short run is a which is s mean value in addition period of 5 years.
multiplied by it nvert it to an elasticity. The long-run response can be calcu-to ((I + b)/X) to cOl following lated by combining this estimate with our These calculations produce the taxes and estimate of \, the partial adjustment pa-elasticities: -0-10 for overlying magnirameter. The estimated coefficient on the -.065 for income taxes, These ble to, but, not surprlr,-lagged base variable, 0.54, implies that k tudes are cOrnPara the property tax rate is 0.46 and that slightly less than half of ingly, smaller than e Policy clgnificance the adjustment to long-run equilibrium elasticity of -.15, Th agnitudes @sof these Yn occurs during a five-year period. This ad-of the relative size tion. justment speed means that our best esti-is discussed in the coricludilig sec es, the e tax variab) tnate of the long-run elasticity of the tax in contrast to th iables is base to the property tax rate is -0.15 perfomance of the service var ures of (equals -0.075/0.46). Thus, if the prop-somewhat disappointing. The. meas the ,Ieous services enter erty tax rate in one city were twice that crime and iniseellai n with the predicted of another city and this difference per-preferred equatio sisted over time, we predict that per capsigns, but with relatively large ,taiaard identified in a statistical sense thanks to cities, with more going to large central the nature of the data base and the at-cities than to their wealthier suburbs. tention devoted to the specification of the With the recent dramatic decline in direct revenue equation as well as to the base federal aid to cities at the same time that equation.
costly-to-serve households such as the poor This -0.15 would be easy to interpret tend to be increasingly concentrated in if the implicit experiment underlying our central cities, such cities may need to inapproach were unambiguous.
The esti-crease local tax rates more relative to their mating equation, however, focuses on suburbs than they have in the past (Ladd comparisons among large central cities, and Yinger (1989) ). If this outcome ocsetting aside intrametropolitan differcurs, city tax bases may decline more than ences in tax rates and service levels .20 If predicted in this study because investors one were willing to assume that city and would find cities even less attractive than suburban tax rates and service levels move in the past relative to their surrounding together, the coefficient estimate would areas. imply that a 10 percent increase in a cenHow reasonable is the preferred estitral city's property tax rate, accompanied mate? In the absence of comparable studby a proportionate change in suburban tax ies, one approach is to evaluate it with rates, would decrease the central city's tax reference to the theory of capitalization. base by 1.5 percent. Although the level of Consider, for example, what would haptax rates and services in central cities pen if property tax rates were fully captypically differ significantly from those of italized into property values. By way of other cities within the metropolitan area, illustration, consider a parcel of property the assumption that central city and sub-worth $100,000 and subject to a 0.8 perurban tax rates and service levels move cent tax rate, the average city's rate in the together over time is plausible because sample. Then consider the change in value cities within a metropolitan area are sub-predicted to occur with a 10 percent inject to similar state fiscal institutions and crease in the tax rate, to 0.88 percent. Aseconomic pressures. For example, a re-suming the resulting $80 tax increase were duction in state aid for local governments expected to continue indefinitely, full or a turndown in the state economy are capitalization would lead to a 1.5 percent likely to put upward pressure on local tax reduction in the value of the property (as rates both in central cities and in their our equation predicts) provided the relesuburbs.
vant discount rate were 5.3 percent (since In reality, however, central city and $80/0.053 -$1500 -1.5 percent of suburban tax rates exhibit some indepen-$100,000). Thus, at a discount rate of 5.3 dent variation. This observation implies percent, the estimated long-run elasticity that the -0. 15 elasticity indicates the av-of -0.15 would be fully consistent with 100 erage long-run effect of a change in the percent capitalization.
For higher discentral city tax rate plus the effects of count rates, the estimated elasticity incorresponding changes in suburban tax dicates a larger impact than would be imrates and service levels that occurred plied by capitalization alone and for lower during the sample period. Provided sub-rates, it indicates a smaller impact. urban tax and service levels continue to Even if one accepted 5.3 percent as the move in the same way as they have done correct discount rate, one should not inin the past relative to changes in the cen-terpret our results as evidence that proptral city tax rate, the reported elasticity erty taxes are fully capitalized into valaccurately predicts the long-run effects of ues. In contrast to previous studies that a change in central city tax rates.
explicitly measure capitalization (e.g. The reported elasticity could, however, Oates, 1969), we purposely do not control understate the effects of future increases for the amount of capital in the city. Hence in central city tax rates. The elasticity was the estimated response of property values estimated for a period of time characterrepresents the combined effects of some ized by rapid increases in federal aid to capitalization (price change) and some physical disinvestment in the city (change cal sales taxes which appear to have virin the quantity of capital). That is, part tually no effect on the property tax base. of the reduction in the base probably rep- Table 4 compares the effects of the varresents the decision of some potential res-ious taxes, using the coefficients from the idents (households and firms) not to move partial adjustment equation. The entries into the city, the decision of some firms in the first column show the impact on the to let their city property depreciate as they logarithm of the property tax base of a 10 invest elsewhere, and the decision of some percent increase in a particular tax rate city residents to disinvest in their resi-or, equivalently for nonproperty taxes, in dential structures by reducing maintetax revenues. As changes in logarithms, nance. This decrease in investment oc-the entries (multiplied by 100) can be incurs simultaneously with a fall in the price terpreted as percentage changes in the of city land and stops once the after-tax base. Thus, a 10 percent increase in the rate of return to investment is again property tax rate is predicted to reduce the equalized across jurisdictions.
base by 1.5 percent, while a 10 percent inAs noted earlier, this study provides new crease in the local income tax rate is preevidence that taxes other than city propdicted to reduce the base by only 0.7 pererty taxes also affect the size of a city's cent. The estimated impact of a 10 percent property tax base. The one exception is lo-increase in overlying taxes is a 1.0 per- Table 3. al972 dollars. bthe first entry was evaluated at the average tax base and tax rate in the sample.
The second entry was evaluated for average tax revenues. (Vol. XLI cent decline in the base, halfway between finance them by higher noncity taxes, our the impacts of local income and property estimates suggest that the city's property taxes. These findings have two clear im-tax base will increase. Reducing property plications. First, a 10 percent increase in taxes by $10 per capita would increase the a city's property tax rate will produce only tax base by 1.4 to 2.0 percent, an increase an 8.5 percent increase in property tax that more than offsets the much smaller revenues on average in the long run. Sec-decrease of 0.3 percent associated with the ond, increases in city income tax rates or $10 increase in the overlying tax burden 21 in taxes levied by overlying jurisdictions on city residents and firms. such as state and county governments will reduce the property tax revenues col-V. Conclusion lected with a given property tax rate.
The second column of Table 4 focuses Economic theory predicts unambiguattention on equal-yield revenue changes ously that, controlling for service levels, by showing the impact on the (logarithm an increase in local property tax burdens of the) property tax base of a $10 increase reduces the size of the local property tax in per capita tax revenues from each base. This outcome occurs through either source. The two entries for the property or both of two mechanisms: 1) the tax retax reflect evaluation at different averduces the level of economic activity or 2) ages. The 1.4 percent decline was evaluit is capitalized into lower land prices. ated at the average property tax rate and Despite this clear prediction, economists tax base in the sample, while the 2.0 per-know little about the magnitude of the cent decline was evaluated at the average impact. This situation reflects the fact that per capita tax revenues in the sample.
previous researchers have tended to focus Surprisingly, the calculations indicate that either on the location and investment dea $10 increase in local income taxes re-cisions of firms and households or alterduces the size of the property tax base on natively, controlling for the amount of average by more than does a comparable capital in the city, on the extent to which per capita increase in property taxes. This taxes are capitalized into property or land finding is easily reconcilable with the ap-values, but never on both mechanisms siparently contradictory results in column multaneously. 1: a $10 per capita increase in revenue Theoretical predictions about the effrom income taxes requires a much larger fects of local income taxes on property absolute and percentage increase in in-values are somewhat more ambiguous become tax rates than a $10 increase in cause a higher tax on labor income could property tax revenues does in property tax induce firms to substitute away from larates.
bor in favor of land and capital. In prin These results can be used to determine ciple, this substitution effect could offset the net effect on the property tax base of the output effect, but the standard presubstituting revenues from one tax for sumption is that, like higher property another. Assuming constant total tax rev-taxes, higher local income taxes reduce the enue and after allowing time for all ad-size of the local property tax base. This justments, the larger response for income study contributes to our understanding of taxes means that shifting away from these behavioral responses by specifying property taxes toward income taxes re-and estimating a simultaneous model that duces the size of the property tax base. permits us to determine the total impact Shifting away from property taxes in fa-on the size of the local tax base of various vor of local sales taxes, in contrast, in-forms of local taxes, where the total imcreases the size of the local property tax pact includes both the investment and base.
price effects of tax changes. Alternatively if local officials choose to We conclude that taxes affect local reduce property taxes by inducing higher property values more than is typically levels of government to take over some of found in previous studies. In particular, the city's 3ervice responsibilities and to we find that a 10 percent increase in a 522 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XLI 'Fhe literature on local public goods contains two scribed later and thus are appropriately excluded from approaches to the modeling of the local decision to tax the revenue equation. and spend. First and most common is the positive, 15See appendix to Bradbury and Ladd (1985) for a predictive theory of the decision-rfiaking process that full description of how the export ratios were calcustarts with the decisive voter's demand for local pub lated. As noted in the text, the analysis is most com lic goods. According to this approach, local public goods plicated for the property tax. In brief, the share of the are viewed as providing consumption benefits to con property tax falling on land is assumed borne by sumer-voters in the same manner as private goods landowners.
Capital is assumed to be mobile across See, for example, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) , and cities, so the portion of the tax with an initial inei Borcherding and Deacon (1972) . The alternative apdence on capital is assumed to be borne partially by proach emphasizes the investment aspect of public consumers in those markets where taxed producers goo& provided by local governments According to this dominate, and partially by labor and land, approxi view, voters choose an expenditure and tax package mately in line with factor shares. The share of the tax to maximize the value of their property independent that is exported then further depends on the fractions of their demand for public goods. See, for example, of consumers, landowners, and workers who live in. Sonstelie and Portney (1978) , Brueckner (1979) , and side vs. outside the city. Brueckner (1982) . Implicit here is the view that ra-'6Estimates of the revenue equation are not retional asset-owning voters should behave this way ported in this paper. Coefficient estimates are availsince consumption interests "can be satisfied through able from the authors upon request. migration, if necessary" (Sonstelie and Portney, p. 271). 17Consistent with our model, the Hausman tests Two considerations lead us to use the standard de show that the state and federal aid variables are apmand approach. First, we question the applicability propriately excluded from the base equation. An alof the assumptions of the investment approach to het temative view that intergovernmental aid belongs in erogeneous voters in the large central cities of our the base equation makes sense only if tax burdens sample; to satisfy their preferences for public serare not included in the equation. The logic would be vices, many residents of central cities would face high that, after controlling for service levels and their costs costs of moving to other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, of provision, higher intergovernmental transfers lead many of the voters in central cities are not property to lower local tax burdens and that these lower tax owners Second, the demand approach forms the basis burdens are capitalized into a higher valued tax base. for many previous empirical studies of local public
In our model, the tax variables fully capture the inspending that yield reasonable results. We know of direct effects on the tax base of federal and state aid few studies that use the investment approach as the '8'Fhe test works as follows: first the residuals are basis for predicting the behavior of local voters (an calculated from an auxiliary regression of the lagged exception is Brueckner (1982)). We emphasize, how base on the set of exogenous variables in the base ever, that this paper does not explicitly test one apequation, not including the lagged base, plus other proach over the other.
variables hypothesized to be exogenous. Second, one "For a complete description of the basic method tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the ology, see Ladd and Yinger (1989) A similar methresiduals is zero when they are included as an exodology based on Massachusetts communities is deplanatory variable in the base equation. scribed in Bradbury et al (1984) .
'9That is, (cl' dl) and (C2' d2) from footnote 4 "Use of the property tax export rate for the deciare positive. sive voter's tax share implicitly assumes that the 'Given the number of communities in the typical property tax is the marginal tax. If income or sales metropolitan area, determining the relevant indica taxes were instead the marginal tax, we would expect tors of suburban tax rates and service levels is a comtheir export ratios to be positively associated with toplicated task. Furthermore, the data to implement any tal spending and hence with property tax revenues. such measures are not readily available. But in the choice among revenue sources, higher ex-21 Furthermore, if it typically costs the city more on port ratios for nonproperty taxes should have a nega per capita basis to provide the shifted service than ative effect on property tax revenues, as discussed beit costs other municipalities within the jurisdiction low. Export ratios for income and general sales taxes assuming the responsibility, overlying taxes may rise consistently obtain negative signs in the estimates of by less than $10 per capita; hence, the net increase the property tax revenue equation (not reported) and in the property tax base may be slightly greater those for the income tax differ significantly from zero. This implies either that the property tax is the mar ginal tax or that the negative effect of higher nonproperty tax exporting on revenue choice more than REFERENCES offsets its positive effect on total revenue raising where nonproperty taxes are used at the margin. 12 For a complete denvation and discussion of this Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relameasure, see chapter 8 in Ladd and Yinger (fortheom tions (1981) . "Regional Growth: Interstate Tax ing)
Competition," Report A-76. March 1981 (Washing-"One notable exception is Inman (1982) ton, D.C.) "To the extent that city officials are concerned about Bartik, Timothy J. (1985) . "Business Location Decideadweight loss, tax rates on alternative tax instrusions in the United States: Estimates of the Effects ments also belong in the equation. The data allow us of Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics to reject this hypothesis:
The tax base variables of States," Journal of Business and Economw Sta (TRINC and TRSAL) pass the exogeneity test detistics, 3. 
